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Introduction
Urban policy interventions in developing countries often have two objectives. The first is to make cities 'work better' by improving their provision of local public goods, from sewerage to public transport. The second is to limit urbanization, the movement of people from rural areas to already crowded cities. This dual agenda is driven by the idea that the priority for policy should be to alleviate the grim life of urban dwellers in developing countries and slow down the growth of cities to prevent more misery. While there is no doubt about the abysmal conditions in the slums of Nairobi or Calcutta, is the gloomy outlook of many governments in developing countries about their cities justified? More precisely, we ask two related questions. First, do cities favour economic efficiency? Second, do cities and urbanization bolster self-sustained growth? To answer these two questions, an integrated and consistent theoretical frame work is first developed. We start from the idea that the entire urban system is an equilibrium outcome (arguably one where politics and other institutional fea tures play a fundamental role) and lay down a simple graphical device to describe the main feedbacks. The framework is then expanded to focus on a number of specific features of cities in developing countries. This highly tractable and flex ible framework is also used to interpret the existing evidence about cities and urbanization in developing countries.
To the first question about whether cities foster (static) economic efficiency, the answer from the literature is a resounding yes. Cities provide large efficiency benefits and there is no evidence that they systematically hurt particular groups. We show below that this result provides support for the first pillar of traditional urban policies (those that seek to improve the functioning of cities). The impor tance of efficiency benefits from cities also suggests that restricting urbanization entails losses. Our theoretical framework also underscores key complementarities in urban policy and cautions us about a number of pitfalls.
The second question about the dynamic benefits generated by cities is more difficult to answer. The evidence suggests that cities can favour economic growth, provided the largest city in a country does not grow too large compared with the others. While this evidence is not strong enough to provide the basis for radical policy initiatives, it raises further doubts about policies that take a negative stance on cities and discourage labour mobility.
The priority for policy should be to prevent or curb the worst imbalances in urbanization rather than attempt to slow it down or reverse it. Broadening the focus from within-city efficiency to between-city efficiency even suggests that reducing the obstacles to the reallocation of factors and activities across cities is a highly desirable policy objective.
In conclusion, there is nothing wrong with the first traditional pillar of urban policy in developing countries, although it may not be for the reasons that are commonly alleged. In addition, instead of restricting the influx of people into the cities, the second pillar of urban policies in developing countries should be The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our graphical framework is presented in section 2. This section also discusses the main policy issues in the framework. Section 3 reviews the empirical evidence about greater economic efficiency in cities. This section also expands the framework to discuss urban features that are salient in developing countries such as primate city favouritism and dual labour markets. Section 4 focuses on the evidence about the effects of cities on the dynamic of growth and development. Finally, section 5 provides further discussion of a number of policy issues and offers some conclusions.
A simple graphical framework in which to think about urban development

Modelling cities
Economic theories concerned with cities have a common underlying structure.* This structure contains three elements: A spatial structure, a production structure, and some assumptions about the mobility of goods and factors. These elements are necessary for any model of cities to be well specified. It may be tempting to specify an aggregate production function that directly re lates primary factors to the final output, as is customary in much economic anal ysis. This standard simplification is often not adequate in our context because cities are characterized by increasing returns to scale, and how such increasing returns are generated has potentially important policy implications. In particular, 
The '3.5-curve' framework of urban development
We now present a simple model of a city in an urban system. This model, in the spirit of Henderson (1974), can be represented diagrammatically.
The wage curve
The first key relationship is the city aggregate production function relating total output in a city to its inputs. If the three primitive factors of production are land, labour and capital and if furthermore land is perfectly immobile while capital is perfectly mobile, the focus of our attention needs to be on labour. Rather than considering output per worker as function of the size of the urban labour force, it is technically equivalent, but more fruitful in terms of interpretation, to focus our attention on an inverse demand for labour that relates the wage of workers to the size of the urban labour force. This curve is represented in figure 1(a) and referred to as the wage curve in what follows.
In figure 1(a), the wage in a city is increasing in the size of the urban labour force, reflecting the existence of urban agglomeration externalities. The intensity of urban increasing returns is measured by the slope of the wage curve. Since the nature and intensity of increasing returns are expected to differ across activities, the exact shape of the wage curve will also differ. This upward-sloping wage curve stands in sharp contrast with 'neo-classical' wage curves that slope downwards. productive efficiency. However, human concentration is not the only determinant of urban efficiency, which also relies on a broad range of infrastructure from roads and international airports to well-functioning rental markets for commer cial property. Hence, the wage curve can differ across cities because of differences in infrastructure and local institutions. Level differences for the wage curve can For this to be the case, the wage curve must be steeper than the cost of living curve before a certain threshold and flatter beyond. At this threshold, net wages reach their peak (point B in the figure). This peak can be interpreted as identifying a 'pseudo-optimal' city size, which maximizes net wages per capita in the city.5 The reason this is only a 'pseudo-optimum' (also called a constrained optimum) rather than a true optimum is the existence of market failures in pro duction and in the cost of living. These market failures imply that, on the figure, the wage and cost of living curves are not as high as they could be.
The labour supply curve
The second curve represented in figure 1(c) is an inverse labour supply curve. For any level of net wage, it indicates the amount of labour supplied in the city.
For simplicity, we assume that labour supply is a function of city population and ignore labour force participation decisions.
In that case, this curve essentially captures the migration response to the wage in the city under consideration. A flat labour supply curve, as shown in the figure, implies perfect mobility.
In a fully urbanized country, labour mobility takes place primarily across cities, and the labour supply curve of a city mainly reflects the conditions in other cities. In a country not yet fully urbanized, labour mobility mostly implies rural-urban migration, and the labour supply curve of a city mainly reflects the conditions of rural hinterlands. We return to this important issue below. Note, finally, that city-specific effects, such as amenities, shift this curve. More attractive cities face a labour supply curve that is below that of less attractive ones. This is because workers accept a lower net wage and are compensated by higher amenities.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model in absence of any policy intervention can now be derived. The intersection between the labour supply and net wage curves determines the equilibrium. It corresponds to a situation in which workers obtain the net wage they require to come to and stay in the city. This intersection between these two curves may not be unique. In figure 1(c), the two curves intersect twice (at points A and C). The labour supply curve cuts the net wage curve first from 4 This curve is only a difference between two other curves and thus cannot count as a independent relationship. Hence the *3.5 curve' name for this framework. Rather than measuring the cost of living curve in units of the numeraire, one could view the cost of living as a price index. In that case, using the difference between the two curves would be warranted only when one is using a log scale for both the wage and the cost of living curves. Alternatively, the net wage curve might be modified to represent the ratio of the other two curves. higher. This is because solving for the inefficiencies in production and cost of living makes the city more attractive. In turn, the labour supply response implies that workers migrate to the city.
The extent to which a higher net wage curve leads to a higher population versus a higher net wage depends on the slope of the labour supply curve. Perfect mobility (i.e., a flat supply curve) implies that all the gains from curbing the inefficiencies in production and cost of living are translated into a higher population and more crowding. In the absence of mobility, a vertical labour supply curve implies that the upward shift of the net wage curve leads only to higher net wages. It is also important to note that after solving all the inefficiencies associated with production and cost of living, the equilibrium in F does not coincide with the first best at point E.
Barriers to migration
The third source of inefficiencies is related to the labour supply curve and thus to the migration process. The labour supply curve is driven by two different sets of forces. First, it echoes the net wage in the rest of the economy. For many developing countries, we expect the labour supply curve to be mostly a reflection of rural earnings. In that case, a higher net wage in rural areas implies a higher labour supply curve. Second, barriers to migration are also reflected in the labour supply curve. More costly mobility implies a higher and steeper labour supply curve.
Eliminating obstacles to mobility in part (c) of figure 2(iii) thus leads to a lower and flatter labour supply curve. As a result, the equilibrium shifts to point G. In To take a simple example, many developing countries have policies that distort agricultural prices relative to manufacturing prices. Since cities in developing countries are specialized into manufacturing and services, any increase in relative manufacturing prices is likely to translate into higher urban wages and thus a higher wage curve. In turn, this should lead to larger cities. More generally, national technology and government policies are going to be reflected in the wage curve of any particular city, affecting its level and, sometimes, its slope.9
The second issue with the wage curve is related to the market failures beneath it. To repeat, the existence and growth of cities are driven by a variety of mecha nisms whose relative importance is extremely difficult to identify empirically. The market failures associated with these mechanisms then require different correc tive policies. For instance, corrective policies aimed at dealing with labour market matching problems have nothing to do with those aimed at fostering knowledge diffusion, and so on. Put differently, we need some corrective policies for ineffi ciencies that we know close to nothing about. This suggests some caution. 10 Given the limited possibilities for policy to raise the wage curve, the cost of living curve is a more promising area of action for city governments. The main reason is that many of the key determinants of the cost of living curve, such as traffic congestion, are reasonably well-identified problems that we know quite a bit about. From sewerage to public transport, there are many components of the cost of living curve to which local governments can make a big difference. The second main policy issue related to the cost of living curve has to do with poorly defined property rights and the inefficient operations of the land market. This salient issue in many developing countries is dealt with at greater length below. Finally, note that many other policies of local governments such as the provision of public goods and amenities also get reflected in the cost of living curve. This only reinforces the point that the cost of living curve is the traditional area of expertise of city governments and should remain so.
Turning to labour mobility, it is clear that a flatter labour supply curve can potentially lead to important welfare gains by allowing workers to move from low net wage areas to high net wage cities. " As hinted above, this increase in mobility is best carried out by central governments, since any city that unilaterally increases labour mobility may decrease its welfare. This prescription of greater labour mobility runs contrary to many policies in developing countries that aim instead at restricting internal migrations. Given the importance of labour mobility in improving efficiency in the short run, and possibly to foster economic growth in the long run as well, this issue is further developed in the next two sections. ings concern primarily the formal sector. Household surveys that cover both the formal and the informal sectors may be more widely used in the future. At this stage, we can only note that the linkages between formal and informal sector firms are often intense which suggests that agglomeration effects are generated within both the formal and the informal sectors with benefits that accrue to both. It is also worth mentioning that the case-study evidence that supports the existence of agglomeration effects also strongly supports the idea that the informal sector is a strong contributor.
With regard to the cost of living curve, the evidence is scarce. Early works by Thomas (1980) Primate city favouritism can readily be incorporated into our framework. We assume for simplicity that favouritism (or the lack thereof) affects primarily wages.
Earnings are higher than they would otherwise be in the favoured cities. They are also lower than they would otherwise be in the other cities, since favouritism comes at a cost for them. Part (a) of figure 3 This alone would lead to a downward-sloping wage curve and a complete dispersion of manufacturing. However, it seems difficult to completely write off the efficiency effects of urban agglomeration described above. This suggests that the wage curve is determined by opposing forces: market access vs. agglomeration economies. Put differently, as a city grows larger, its regional market gets more crowded so that the prices of locally produced good decline (and this, in turn, leads to lower urban wages), but it also becomes more efficient (which raises urban wages).
Assume that market access effects dominate agglomeration effects in small markets, while the reverse holds in large markets. This implies a wage curve that first slopes downwards and then upwards. This wage curve is represented in fig  ure 4(a) . We concentrate on this case because it has more interesting implications than its opposite. To defend it empirically, one could argue that negative market crowding effects can be very strong at the margin in a very small market, while they are going to be much milder if many firms are already operating in a mar ket. Furthermore, it could also be argued that a minimum city size is needed for agglomeration economies to take place.
It is important to understand that transport costs affect not only the wage curve (through the production of goods) but also the cost of living curve (through their consumption).
A small isolated city may face very low housing and commuting costs. However, consumption goods can be very expensive because most of them are produced elsewhere and need to be shipped to this city at a very high cost.
As the city grows and produces more manufacturing, the price of goods declines, since a smaller proportion of them need to be imported. living curves taking the shape hypothesized above. Let us now turn to policy implications. Improving market access implies better access to other markets but it is also synonymous with a loss of protection for local firms. Depending on which effect dominates, the wage curve can shift upwards or downwards. Better market access for small isolated cities also implies a less steeply decreasing wage curve, so that a flatter wage curve (at least in its early part) is expected. With better access, we also expect a lower cost of living. On balance, for small cities better market access implies a flatter and possibly higher net wage curve. In turn, this implies that the small-city equilibrium at point A should shift to the right (city growth) or even disappear entirely, keeping point C as the only stable equilibrium. With broad-based gains from better market access, we can also expect a higher labour supply curve through general equilibrium effects. As a result of a higher labour supply curve, the equilibrium size of large cities would decrease. The final outcome could be smaller big cities but a larger number of them. is often attributed to a dysfunctional political economy leading to primate city favouritism. There is a lot of empirical support for this. A complementary explanation points to high internal trade costs leading to either large or small cities. A lot of the evidence is consistent with this expla nation as well. In both cases a reduction in urban primacy is desirable. Doing it through a reduction in primate city favouritism may be effective but is hard to implement politically. Improving market access for isolated cities may be politi cally easier to achieve, but the precise effects of better access are more difficult to predict, since improved access may reinforce primacy.
In practice, market access is improved by two sets of policies. The first is about building and developing roads and other transport infrastructure such as airports and high-speed train lines. The second is about removing impediments to trade
Migration and dual labour markets
The framework developed above assigns a positive (and equalizing) role to inter nal migrations and labour mobility. This is in contrast with some of the academic literature and much of the policy reality in developing countries. From internal passports in China and the 'nativist' policies of Indian states to the resettlements policies carried out in Africa and Latin America, there is a strong bias against free labour mobility in many developing countries.
As shown above, restricting the movement of labour is not the right answer if cities become too big, as in the framework exposed above. Another justifi cation for anti-mobility policies rests on the existence of dual labour markets. Instead, restrictions on labour mobility may be part of a political-economy equilibrium. In this latter case, better policies would then be much more difficult to implement. We need to know more about this issue to understand the nature of the challenge for labour mobility and how it may be overcome.
Dual housing markets
The last key feature of cities in developing countries is the existence of a dual housing sector with a division between the formal sector and squatter settle ments (also referred to as slums, invasions, shanty-towns, etc. Squatter settlements are often associated with the idea of low-cost and low quality housing. If it was only this, it would be simply a reflection of the general poverty of some urban dwellers opting out of the formal housing sector because they cannot afford it. Policy decisions regarding what to do with squatter settle ments would mostly be choices about how much redistribution to do (or not to do) and whether it is best to do this redistribution through subsidized housing and public services or by other means.
These issues are important, but there is more to squatter settlements than this. Finally, once the absence of public services or their very poor quality is taken into account, squatter settlement may not be so cheap. For instance, water in slums often needs to be bought at a very high price from local water distributors. Without titles, squatters must also often pay a steep price for some form of protection and so on. If we take the last two ideas seriously about exclusionary zoning by the formal sector and the relatively high costs of squatter settlements, it is possible to expand our theoretical framework to gain some insights about dual housing markets.
In figure 6(a) , we assume a standard upward-sloping wage curve that applies to all city residents.25 In figure 6(b) , there are three cost of living curves. The 25 In many cities with squatter settlements, a significant proportion of slum dwellers have a job in the formal (production) sector. As a first-order approximation, we assume that all workers benefit from agglomeration effects. A more refined version of the graph would take into account the possibility that slums may often be located far from the main places of work and poorly served by public transport.
In such a case, slum dwellers would be less likely to benefit from agglomeration effects. We acknowledge this, but it is not core to the argument here, which focuses on the housing market. 
Titling'
policies are also desirable because, as argued above, poorly defined property rights have a range of other negative side-effects. After solving disputes over land ownership and the financing of the titles handed out, the main issues with titling policies are, first, how to avoid further pre-emptive invasions driven by the expectation of a future title and, second, how to make sure that there is a local tax counterpart to legalized titles. In some respect, the problems in dealing with illegal settlements are the same as those of urban favouritism. There are many dimensions associated with this phenomenon, and it is not clear yet which are those that matter most empirically. As in the situation of urban favouritism, there is also a political economy of illegal settlements with vested interests that benefit from slums, either directly by charging their residents, or indirectly by providing expensive substitutes for missing public services. These vested interests often pose formidable challenges. We now ask whether cities and urbanization can affect the long-run rate of eco nomic growth. To answer this question, we first expand the simple graphical device introduced above to help us think about urban dynamics.
In a multi period setting, workers are initially endowed with some human capital. In each period, they spend part of their time working. They consume their labour market earnings at the end of each period. They also spend part of each period learning, so that at the following period they start with a higher level of human capital and are more productive. Workers work and learn in the city where they are located.
We can represent this in figure 7(a) 
The empirics of growth and cities
Our dynamic framework relies on the existence of some human capital exter nalities in cities that underpin the upward-sloping expansion curve. These exter nalities affect the learning of workers. In turn, these assumptions imply that the urban structure affects aggregate economic growth. Let us examine the empirical evidence on these three elements. A first line of argument is recognizing that the expansion curve may be driven not by overall city size as in figure 7 but instead by the concentration of 'inno vation inputs.' Duranton and Puga (2001) argue that modern systems of cities experience a division between cities where innovation takes place ('nursery cities' with a very diverse production structure) and cities that are more specialized in the production of one particular set of goods. In developed economies, the last 50 years have also seen a growing separation between business centres, which host headquarters and business services, and production cities, which host production By underscoring the need for better public service delivery and the importance of housing and commuting issues, this set of recommendations is consistent with some of the objectives of many existing urban policies. The main difference is that our baseline framework also emphasizes labour mobility. This emphasis is strongly at odds with existing urban policies that often seek, on the contrary, to reduce labour mobility and more generally to promote some form of stability. 
